The Inflationary Process in Israel: Shocks and Accommodation by Michael Bruno & Stanley Fischer
NBER WORKING PAPERSERIES




Working Paper No. 11483




The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program
in Economic Fluctuations. ny opinions expressed are those of the
authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #1483
October 1984
The Inflationary Process in Israel:
Shocks and Accommodation
ABSTRACT
The rate of inflation in Israel increased from 8percentin 1965 to 300—400
percent in the first half of 1984. The inflationary process until 1977 was not
qualitatively different from that in the OECD countries, but after the financial
liberalizationof 1977 the economy appeared to move into a new era in which the
inflation rate seemed capable only of rising. Our explanation of the
inflationaryprocess is that because of institutional adaptations, and as a
result of accommodating monetary and fiscal policies, the stabilizing forces in
the economy are so weak that the inflation rate is in a metastable equilibrium.
We ascribe the apparent asymmetry of the inflation to the expansionary underlying
thrustof monetary and fiscal policy.
Wedevelop an analytical framework that assigns roles to indexation, to the
financial structure, and to the exchange rate system in determining the dv-namjcs
of the economy. We place very little blame for the inflation on wage indexation,
which has been incomplete, but we regard the extensive indexation of the returns
on financial assets, and the steady shift out of nominal assets, as major
contributing factors, for the economy is now left with virtually no nominal
anchor. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of alternative stabilization
plans, arguing that a successful stabilization program will have to be
comprehensive and rapid.
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THE INFLATIONARY PROCESS IN ISRAEL: SHOCKS ANDACCOMODATION
Israel's annual inflation rate increased from 8 percent in 1965 to 300—400
percent in the first half of 1984. Up to 1977, the process of inflation in
Israel does not appear qualitatively different from that in the OECD
countries (see Bruno in this volume). Indeed, even after it jumped to 40—
50 percent after the Yom Kippur War, the inflation rate declined slowly
until, by the first half of 1977, prices were rising at an annual rate of
25 percent. After the financial liberalization of late 1977, theeconomy
appeared to move into a new era, with inflation firmly entrenched, and
seemingly capable only of rising.
In this paper we provide an overview and analysis of the inflationary
process, seeking to explain the increases in the inflation rate and the
forces that keep it high and, on occasion, rising. There has been no
shortage of explanations of inflation: it has been ascribed to indexation,
tomonetary policy, to the budget deficit, to the introduction of floating
exchange rates, to "bubbles" —self—justifyingexpectations of inflation —
toname only some of the most prominent. Several of these explanations
provide necessary conditions for the continuation of the process, as we
shall show below.
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inflation rate down through restrictive policy that might produce a major
recession, there remain serious economic questions about the forces
driving the inflationary process and the institutional adaptations that
permit the economy to operate at a reasonable level of efficiency despite
inflation. In a nutshell, our explanation of the inflation will be that
because of institutional adaptations, and as a result of accommodating
monetary and fiscal policies, the stabilizing forces in the economy are
very weak, leaving the inflation rate in a meta—stable equilibrium.This
means that the inflation rate could come down as well as rise, but the
underlying thrust of fiscal and monetary policies during the period has
been expansionary, with the result that the adaptation of the inflationary
process, including expectations formation, has been smoother upwards and
more rigid downwards, even when cost—reducing factors were occasionally
operative.
In developing our analytical framework below we assign roles to
indexation,to financial structure, and to the exchange rate system in
determining thedynamics of the economy. We also place emphasis on fiscal
and monetary policies that have permitted the inflation to continue.
Before developing the analytical framework, we provide a brief overview of
phases in the inflationary process since 1960.
I. lifE PHASES OF INFLATION
Figure 1 and Table 1 provide an overview of the inflationary history of
the economy in the period since 1960 together with the growth rate of real
output; Table 2 provides summary data on policy and other macroeconomic
2variables over the period. The increase in the inflation rate from the 5—
10 percent range of the early 1960s to the 30O-400 percent range of the
first half of 1984 can be broken down into eight phases (see Table 1).
PHASE 1: Normal Growj0to19:l
The inflation rate in the first half of the 1960s averaged 7 percent,
while GNP was growing at an annual average rate of 10 percent. The infla—
tion rate was high by international standards, the growth rate of output
by the same standards even higher. The government budget over the period
was balanced. The major problem facing the economy at this time was the
current account deficit. An overheated economy (inflation reached 8 per—
cent in 1965—66) led to the adoption of sharply restrictive domestic
policies which, together with an exogenous decline in the rate of immig-
ration and a consequent decline in aggregate demand, produced the 1966—67
recession.
PHASE 2: Recession 1965:1to1967:2
The unemployment rate rose to 12 percent (see Figure 3) while the infla-
tion rate dropped to less than 2 percent. As is usual in recessions, the
rate of unemployment started rising before there was any pronounced fall
in inflation. Nonetheless, within two years there had been a decisive, and
subsequently long—lived, reduction in the inflation rate.
PHASE3Recoy97O:1
Therecession was drawing to an end before the Six Day War broke out in
June1967(the growth rate for 1966 was 0.9 percent and for 1967 it was
2.3 percent). The war was followed by a period of extremely rapid growth,
3with low inflation, based in part on the absorption of those still un-
employed at the end of the recession and in part on inflows of labor from
abroad and the administered territories.
PHASE 4: Boom, 1970:1 to 1973:3
Growth continued at a rapid pace in the first two years of the 1970s, but
with the economy reaching the full employment zone, inflation accelerated
to an annual rate of 22 percent. The variability of the inflation rate
also increased, as a result of fluctuations in the exchange rate and of
the occasional adoption of incomes policies.
PHASE 5: War and Oil Shock, 1973:4 to 1977:2
The growth rates of both output and productivity dropped sharply; infla-
tion accelerated to an annual average rate of 37 percent, with accom-
panying high variability, due to the rise in import prices and to a series
of sharp devaluations up to June 1975, when a crawling peg was instituted
and maintained until 1977, aided by a one—time 10 percent devaluation in
September 1975.
PHASE 6: Traverse, 1977:3 to 1979:3
The period started with the liberalization of foreign exchange transac-
tions in October 1977. The liberalization allowed Israelis to hold foreign
currency accounts at home and abroad, as well as to hold limited amounts
of foreign currency in cash. Virtually all foreign exchange controls were
lifted; export subsidies and import tariffs were also reduced. This was
accompanied by a sharp 50 percent devaluation of the currency, without
other restrictive measures being taken. The major jump in the inflation
4rate nonetheless caine some time after the foreign exchange liberalization.
This period of transition to three digit inflation rates willreceive
particular attention in our subsequent analysis.
PHASE7: 1979:4to 1983:3
This four—year period of high inflation (at annualaverage rates between
100 and 130 percent) is quite remarkable. In spite of thehigher average
inflation rate, the variability of quarterly inflation as measuredby its
standard deviation was actually lower in absolute terms than in thetwo
previous phases. A failed attempt at stabilization by a sustained slowdown
in the rate of devaluation ended in a major devaluation in October1983,
accompanied by a collapse of the value of bank shares, hitherto amajor
financial asset.
PHASE8:RunawayInflation?
The October1983 devaluation and subsidy cuts resulted in a rapid rise in
thepricelevel; in October the rate of inflation was 21 percent. The new
Finance Minister declared that his firstprioritywas the balance of
payments; the implication was that the inflation rate would be allowed to
increase if that was necessary to improve the current accountdeficit,
which in the third quarter of 1983 had reached an annual rate of six
billion dollars or 25 percent of GDP.
In the event inflation did rise rapidly, to an annualrate of 400
percent (compounded monthly) for the first five months of 1984. With
elections approaching in July 1984, the economic situation at the time of
writing was both unclear and volatile.
5II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
We use a standard aggregate supply—demand framework to analyze inflation.
The particular Israeli emphasis comes in the description of the properties
of assets and of wage indexation, in the policy choices that make the
growth rate of money and the composition of the outstanding stock of
government debt endogenous, and in the magnitudes of the government and
current account deficits that drive the processes of accumulation of
domestic government and foreign debts.
The position of the aggregate supply (AS) schedule depends on wages
and associated payroll taxes, raw material prices, the cost of capital,
and technology; the position of the aggregate demand (AD) curve is deter-
mined by the value, liquidity, and composition of wealth, by the exchange
rate and foreign variables —demand,prices, and interest rates —by
fiscal policy variables, and by expectations of inflation and exchange
rate changes. Continuous shifts in the aggregate supply and demand curves
trace out the changing price level and output.
To analyze the dynamics of inflation, we write the aggregate supply
and demand curves (which relate output to the nominal price level) as
functions of their major driving variables. Thus,
(1) =g(W/P,E/P, t, a)
Here Yis the supply of output, W is the nominal wage (as a cost to
the employer, and thus including payroll taxes), P is the price level,
E is the nominal exchange rate that determines the domestic cost of
imported raw materials, t is a variable representing the state of tech-
nology, and a represents missing supply variables, movements in which
6can be thought of as supply shocks (e.g., the world price of raw mate-
rials),
On the aggregate demand side we have
(2) =f(H/P,V, G —T,E/P, y* e z)
We represent aggregate demand as a function of the real stock of
high—powered money (H/P), real wealth (V), the government domestic demand
surplus (C —T),the real exchange rate (E/P), foreign income (y*), the
expected rate of inflation (ire), and z, a demand shock variable rep-
resenting also omitted demand factors. We shall subsequently consider the
domestic budget deficit as a fraction ()ofGNP. Because there is no
agreed—upon measure of the liquidity of the stock of assets, we omit that
determinant of aggregate demand from (2).
To understand the dynamics of the inflationary process, we need to
analyze the determinants and dynamics of the variables specified in the
aggregate supply and demand curves (1) and (2). Starting on the aggregate
supply side, wages are determined in bi—annual wage negotiations that £ ix
a base wage level and indexation formulae for the adjustment of the wage
to changes in the price level. Typically the indexation clauses have pro-
vided for partial (70—80 percent), semi—annual and subsequently quarterly,
compensation for price changes. The non--adjustment of wages for a period
of three months at high rates of inflation makes for a marked within—
quarter variation of wages; the less—than—complete compensation for infla—
tion means that real wages at very high rates of inflation would fall
rapidly over the life of a contract) This account of the wage adjust-
ment process makes it difficult to blame indexatjon as the main factor
determining the behavior of wages, since even in the short run there are
7always discretionary elements in the wage—setting process.
The second argument in the supply function is the real exchange rate,
representing the prices of imported rawmaterials.2 A depreciation or
devaluation (increase in E) will shift the AS schedule up, tending to
increase prices and reduce output. If the Bank of Israel follows a pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) rule, then domestic price level shocks are
automatically transformed into inflationary exchange rate changes. We
shall later discuss the behavior of the economy when the government was
following a set of operating rules that include PPP for control of the
exchange rate (from around 1975 onwards).
Many of the most significant factors in the Israeli inflation enter
in the first three arguments of the aggregate demand function (2), in the
interaction of monetary and fiscal policies and in the dynamics of asset
supplies. Private sector wealth consists of some nominal assets, largely
currency and demand deposits, of various government liabilities indexed to
either the price level or the foreign exchange rate, of some foreign
assets, and consumer durables, housing, and private ownership of corpora-
tions. We simplify by concentrating on the stock of high—powered money, H,
government bonds indexed to the price level (B)1 government bonds indexed
to the exchange rate (Bf) and direct ownership of foreign exchange (F).
Thus, wealth is given by:
1
Special indexation adjustments to wages are paid more frequently than
quarterly if the inflation rate exceeds a specified level. For more
details on wage indexation see Kleiman's chapter in this volume.
2We do not explicitly discuss other factors affecting the rate of shift
of the aggregate supply curve beyond noting that supply factors played
a significant role in the slowdown of growth in Israel since the early
1970's (see Bruno in this volume). The growth slowdown in turn affected
the inflation rate, as we discuss below.
8(3) V =H/P+B+ EBf/P +EF/P
In (3) Bf and F are the foreign—currency denominated valuesof
holdings of foreign—currency linked bonds and foreigncurrency respec-
tively. The dynamics of inflation in Israel is significantly affectedby
the fact that domestic bonds (B) are fixed in realvalue, and that the
nominal value of much of the remainder of thegovernment debt (EBf)
automatically increases when there is a devaluation. Thus the Israeli
economy does not have the automatic inflation stabilizer that an increase
in the price level and/or the exchange rate reduces realprivate sector
wealth by reducing the real value of theoutstanding stock of government
debt, except for the possibility that the real value of themonetary base
would fall. Indeed, if the government ispursuing a PPP exchange rate
policy, then any domestic inflationary shock automatically increases the
nominal value of wealth virtually panpassu.
Examining the aggregate demand function (2), and assuming both that
the government budget deficit is fixed in real terms3 andthat the ex-
change rate is determined by PPP, we see that the onlypotential element
of non—homogeneity or non—accommodation toprice rises on the demand side
is H, the nominal stock of high poweredmoney. The monetary base, H,
is a smallnominalmagnitude with which to control the price level
(assuming a given real exchange rate and real wage) so thateven if H
were held strictly constant when the price levelrose, it might be ex—
In fact, there have been two elements making foran increase in the
real deficit with a rise in the price level —onewas the un—indexed
debt of the private sector (which by 1984 hasvirtually been eroded by
inflation) and the other was the lag in the collection of taxes.
9pected to exert at best a small and slow stabilizing influence.
Such stabilization would arise from the rise in the rate of interest
caused by the reduction in the real money base. But suppose the monetary
authority is attempting to control the real rate of interest, as it has in
Israel. Then the quantity of high—powered money becomes endogenous, and in
response to an increase in the price level and consequent upward pres—sure
on the interest rate, the stock of high—powered money is increased. Thus
the stabilizing element that could have been provided by keeping H to a
prescribed path is lost. There would accordingly be no forces on the
demand side of the economy tending to resist rising prices.4 The price
level then does not tend to return to its original level, or to any equl—
libriuin level, unless some element of policy —beit monetary or fiscal —
isdirected to that end.
The above discussion implies that we could expect the aggregate
demand (AD) schedule to be quite steep or virtually vertical. The very
short—run AS curve, on the other hand, will be considerably flatter,
becauseof imperfect wage indexation (see previous discussion) and as long
as the economy is operating below capacity (which itdidin the mid—
1970s);the short run is defined here as the indexation period for wages.
A further difficulty has been pointed out to us by Rafi Melnick. In the
semi—conventional full—employment IS—LM model with nominal bonds, and
with policy that fixes the real interest rate (assume adaptative expec-
tations to avoid well—known problems of indeterminacy when expectations
are rational), goods market equilibrium determines the real value of
wealth. The appropriate interest rate is then enforced through open
market operations in which bonds and money are exchanged. However, if
money is the only nominal asset, and the real value of wealth is deter-
mined in the goods market, the real value of money balances are also
determined. Then, given the conventional demand for money function,
there may be an inconsistency between the specified interest rate that
clears the goods market and the rate that clears the money market. The
inconsistency is removed if output becomes endogenous.
10However, since wages have also been effectively indexed, though at a time
lag (which has become shorter over time), one could expect greater steep.—
ness of the AS curve as one moves from the very short run (say, a quarter
or less) to somewhat longer time spans (say, six months or more). The
price level may thus become very sensitive to shocks. As we shall see,
this problem has worsened as the inflationary process accelerated towards
the end of the 1970g.
The steepness of the AD curve and relative flatness of the shortrun
AS curve would imply that in the short run price level changes would
mainly be affected by cost factors (wages and input prices) and less by
demand shifts, while demand shifts would feature large in short—runoutput
changes (see Bruno in this volume).
Equating the supply (1) and the demand (2) relationships and looking
at the implied equilibrium in rate—of-change form wemay write down the
rate of change of the price level (P/P =ir)as a linear function of
the rates of change of the three key nominal magnitudes: the nominalwage
(,= /W),the exchange rate (è =E/E),and the money base (i =cl/H),
iU5 SUiy shift (j.i) and demand shift (lid) factors, These are com-
bined into one factor (li) which can be expected to be dominatedby the
supply side.
(4)
where p=logP, m=logH, w=logW, e=logE.
The description of the price dynamics can be completed bywriting
down a Philips—type equation for wages as a function of prices and labor—
market slack, and adjustment rules for the exchange rate and themoney
11base during periods for which these could not be considered exogenously
determined.
Consider now the longer—run implications of such price dynamics when
the above nominal magnitudes are themselves each indexed to past inflation
(iT1) and/or to inflationary expectations (l1e) If the system is homoge-
neous we could summarize the inflationary process in the form
(5)
where is a summary statistic involving supply and demand shocks,
as well as shocks to w, e, and m.
Suppose that expectations are adaptive, with coefficient of adapta-
tion ,sothat
(6) = +(1 —
Solving(5) and (6) we obtain:
(7)
1=1
Equation (7) shows that when (1 —a)(1—) becomesvery small,5 a
positive shock > 0will be transmitted into an immediate jump in the
inflation rate — >0) rather than just a jump in the
As the degree of inflation itself accelerates the degree of persistence
a (i.e., direct indexation of the nominal magnitudes) will tend to
increase towards unity. Likewise, the coefficient of adaptation of
expectations ()risestowards unity.
12price level.6 Thus, one puzzling feature of the Israeli inflation —
theapparent tendency for a shock to the price level (such as a devalua—
tion) to result in a permanent change in the inflation rate —canbe
explained as a result of accommodating macro policies.
But there is a second feature of the inflation that needs explana-
tion: the inflation rate jumps up quite readily but does not fall in the
same way. Suppose the indexation or the expectation—formation mechanisms
are not symmetric upwards and downwards. The coefficient of adaptation ()
islikely to depend on the state of the economy as perceived by indivi-
duals and firms. For example, when the general thrust of fiscal and mone—
tary policy is highly expansionary and there is a temporary unexpected
downward shift in inflation in period t —I(ir1 — < 0), may
be very small (or zero) so that expectations are not revised downward
[i.e., in equation (6) we get even though <
while would be large (or close to 1) when the unexpected shock is
positive (Tr1 >Tr1).The effect of such asymmetries is to make a
sequence of positive and negative shocks of zero mean impart an upward
thrust to the inflation rate.
If the inflation rate follows the random walk implied by (7) when
=1or=1,then the inflation rate could, in the long run, be at
any level. But if is slightly less than one, that is, if there is any
element of non—homogeneity in the equation for the inflation rate, the
6
If expectations are rational, we obtain
(7') =_i+ + [(1 —c)/aJlEt
wheret---isthe expectation, formed at (t —1),of c. In this
case the key determinant of the behavior of the inflation rate is a.
13system will tend —perhapsvery slowly —toreturn to an equilibrium long—
run inflation rate.7
In particular, fiscal policy considerations may determine the average
growth rate of money, through the government budget constraint, even if
monetary policy does not pursue explicit monetary growth targets. We can
write the government budget constraint as
(8) G—T=Y =ñ/P+,
where the dot indicates the change in a variable. We here suppress the
difference between bonds indexed to the domestic price level and to the
exchange rate, and omit direct government sales of foreign exchange, which
will be added subsequently.
In steady state, the ratios H/(PY) and B/Y, where Yisreal GM', are
constant. Accordingly in steady state, the growth rate of high—powered
money 11/H ()isequal to the inflation rate (Tr) plus the growth rate of
output
(9) th=Tr+gy
Similarly, the growth rate of bonds ()isequal to the growth rate of
output
(10) =5
Notethe distinction betweeen the questions of whether the price level
or the inflation rate returns to a steady state level. Suppose the
inflation rate is described by 7r =a+ O.95ir
1÷ where is
white noise. Then the expected long—run rate o inflation is determi-
nate and equal to [a/(l —0.95)=20a}.But shocks to the price_level
are permanent. If the price level jumps by 10 percent today there is no
expectation that subsequently the price level will tend to return to
its original level or expected path.
14Accordingly, in steady state the government budget constraint becomes
(11) =(cr+g)(H/PY)
+g(B/Y)
Now let h denote the ratio of the stock of real high—poweredmoney to
nominal GNP (H/PY), and b the ratio of bonds to GNP (B/Y). Then,
(12) 11= [(5g(h+b)I/h
Equation (12) gives one approach to analyzing the determinants of the
growth rate of the monetary base and thus, in steady state, of the infla-
tion rate. The term following gin the denominator in (12) is the
amount of the deficit that can be financed by the government through the
sale of bonds and printing of money without increasing their respective
ratios to GNP. The more rapid the growth rate of output, the greater the
share of the deficit that can be financed in a non—inflationaryway. The
larger the government deficit, (5,the higher the inflation rate in the
steady state. And the larger the monetary base, the lower the inflation
rate need be.8
The government budget deficit obviously plays a major role in this
steady—state analysis. There is no reason, though, to expect a close
short—run connection between the inflation rate and the size of the gov—
ernment budget deficit. For it has to be remembered, when using the
8
A more complete analysis takes into account the dependence of h in
the denominator of (12) on the expected inflation rate, and raises the
possibility that there are two equilibria for the economy at which a
given amount of revenue from the printing of money can be obtained —
oneat a relatively low inflation rate, and one at a higher rate. We
regard this possibility as more than a theoretical curiosity as we
shall note when discussing the Israeli experience below. The analysis
can also be extended to study the non—steady state dynamics of infla-
tion, and to recognize that b depends on the real interest rate.
15approach implied by (12), that we used the quantity theory in equation (9)
to link the inflation rate to the growth rate of money in the steady
state. But in the short run there is at best a very loose connection
between the growth rate of the stock of high—powered money and inflation.
We can now extend the government budget constraint (8) to include the
government's foreign account and changes in the government's foreign debt
('G). We get:
(8') (+óf)Y=fl/P++EFG/P.
Here is the government's external deficit as a percentage of GNP.
The external deficit (sometimes a surplus) is equal to the deficit on
goods and services minus unilateraltransfers.9
Equation (8'), the overall government budget constraint, shows that
the government finances its total deficit in three ways: through the
printing of high—powered money, through sales of bonds (indexed either to
the price level or to the exchange rate) and through borrowing abroad.
Sales of foreign exchange to domestic residents, one way of financing a
domestic deficit, do not necessarily imply increases in foreign indebted-
ness of the government: if the government has an overall foreign surplus,
then the sale of foreign exchange is merely the means through which the
foreign surplus finances part of the domestic deficit. It should be noted
that FG is the government's net foriegn debt. Thus if the government
runs down foreign exchange reserves to sell foreign currency to domestic
residents it is, in terms of (8'), engaging in foreign borrowing.
Capital gains or losses on the oustanding debt have to be treated con-
sistently in defining the service account and the external deficit.
16The use of the government budget constraint (8) or (8?) does not
necessarily imply that the government consciously decides on a particular
growth rate of high—powered money as a means of financing its budget
deficit. Rather, in the Israeli context, it is much more likely that the
government turns to printing money as its last resort in budget financing.
First it decides what it needs to spend arid how much it can raise through
taxes (and foreign borrowing), then it sells as many bonds as it can at
the existing interest rate, and the rest is financed by printing money.'°
Relatively small changes in the deficit would be consistent in the long
run with major changes in the growth rate of H, and thus of inflation,
according to this approach. But the transitional costs of moving from a
high—inflation to a low—inflation equilibrium could be sufficient to
inhibit such a change. We believe this to be particularly important in the
Israeli context.
The current stock of government debt is the result of past deficits,
and the prospective size of the debt is a function of expected deficits.
A large current debt may inhibit monetary policy by preventing aggressive
use of interest rate variations for current stabilization purposes, for
FizrhtI noInt-rct-o rriil clIoniHtnntl v I th
budgetdeficit or thwart the finance of future deficits because of fluc-
tuations in bond prices. Prospective deficits influence aggregate demand
and the terms at which the government can obtain both current and future
financing.
The analytical framework presented in this section is reasonably
conventional. The major departure from standard macroeconomic models lies
10See also Fischer (1984).
17in the structure of assets, for wage indexation is found in many coun-
tries. As we shall argue below, abnormal macroeconomic behavior in Israel
has to be attributed at least as much to specific policy choices that, for
instance, produce large budget deficits, and/or endogenize the rate of
growth of money, as to peculiar structural characteristics of the economy.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE INFLATIONARY ECONOMY
Policy since 1965 has been significantly affected by the experience of the
1965—67 recession, when restrictive policies were implemented primarily to
bring the current account deficit closer to balance, but also to counter-
act the then high (8 percent) rate of inflation. The resultant unemploy-
ment of more than 10 percent brought both social demoralization and emig-
ration, with the result that maintenance of low rates of unemployment was
considered a major policy goal during the crises of the 197Os. Despite the
rising rate of inflation since 1970, there has been no strong political
C-...1-.4 -.. ..-..1 -1 ..-. ....-
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penseof temporary unemployment. Widespread indexation, particularly of
asset returns, reduced the perceived and actual costs of any given rate of
inflation and helped keep inflation from becoming the dominant economic
policy issue.
The major features of the inflation process that were seen in Figure 1
are the generally rising trend of the inflation rate since 1965, and the
apparent step nature of the changes. To understand the inflation process
we have to understand both why the inflation rate has been on a rising
trend, and the reasons for the jumps.
181. Inflation Djnamics
On the demand side, we shall argue, expansive fiscal policy and accommo-
dative monetary and exchange—rate policy have generally combined to main-
tain upward pressure on the price level and the rate of inflation and as a
result of the structure of the financial system and the policy choices,
the automatic forces that could stabilize inflation in response to supply
shocks are very weak. Favorable shocks were usually exploited to help
expand demand (in the last few years, consumption) and output while un-
favorable ones were not counteracted for any length of time by restrict-
ive discretionary policy. Temporary contractionary policies were under-
taken (as in 1975—77 and in 1980); they were usually accompanied by cost—
increasing measures (devaluation, indirect taxes, and a cut in subsidies)
which pushed up the AS curve, while the flatness of the AS curve implied
that contraction showed up in output rather than in prices. A short run
accountof inflationary dynamics willthen be dominated by supply—side
factorsto which we turn first. The important underlying role of the
budget deficit and of the monetarysystem in accountingfor shifts in
long—run steady state inflation will be taken up subsequently.
The cost—side dynamics of inflation has featured in several accounts
of the inflationary processin the 1960s and early 1970s, the best known
beinga pair of annual wage and consumer—price equations for the period
1958—1975 by Artstein and Sussman (1977).h1 Prices are a functionof wages
andimportpricesplus a small, hardly significant, role for money, while
This is discussed briefly in another chapter in this volumeandwill
not be repeated here. For a quarterly regression of the same kind see
Bruno and Sussrnan (1979).After1977regressionsbased onannualdata
would miss a considerable part of the dynamics. SeealsoZilberman
(1984).
19wages are a function of prices, unemployment, and the increased labor
supply from the territories (a very important wage—moderating factor in
the years 1968—1972).
It can be argued12 that with a high degree of correlation between the
nominal magnitudes (prices, wages, exchange rates, and money) price equa-
tions of the typical kind are difficult to interpret, especially after
1975. However, this problem can be partly side—stepped by running such an
equation in real terms, namely, in the form of first differences with
respect to past inflation. The following equation is obtained, in terms of
wholesale prices (to neutralize, to the extent possible, subsidies and
demand elements) for the 66 quarters 1966:3 to 1982:413 —








where n is import prices.
An attempt to add monetary variables to this equation on the whole
fails, with the exception of an apparent five-quarter—lagged effect of
12
As recently shown by Melnick (unpublished study).
13The correlation coefficient (p) between * — and — for
the whole period 66:3—82:4 is 0.24, but this turns out to be dominated
by high collinearity during the first oil crisis 73:4—77:1 (p =0.571)
while the correlation is virtually nil in all other periods: 66:3—77:3
(p =—0.025),77:2—82:4 (p =0.066).The equation was also tested for
the implied homogeneity assumption by adding to the right—hand
side. This gives a zero coefficient (—0.005 with standard error 0.037).
It is also remarkably stable with respect to length of period or break-
up into sub—periods.
20real credit expansion on inflation during 79:4—82:4. We shall come back to
the important role of real import prices and real credit expansion in the
traverse to the higher inflation plateau.
Continuing in the line of cost—side adjustments in the inflationary
process we recall the argument that wages (w) can in turn be related to
lagged inflation. Likewise, the exchange rate followed an approximate
PPP rule (plus occasional jumps) since the introduction of the crawling
peg in 1975:3.
Instead of fitting an equation like (13) we could therefore run a
regression of inflation acceleration ( —f1)on its own past lags
plus the acceleration in exchange rate adjustment ( — Using
four—quarter lags and running the regression over sub—periods during
1965:1 to 1982:4 we find coefficients of 0.20—0.29 for (é —
similarto the ones found in the previous regression and also in Art—
stein and Sussman (1977); we also test and find that the inflation rate
Is homogeneous in terms of its own past lags.14 What is more inter-
esting is the finding, already recorded by Gottlieb and Piterrnan (1982),
that the share of quarterly inflation 'explained by the inflation of
the previous two quarters continuously rises over time, The implied
coefficients are, respectively,
14 . . . Thisis done by adding p4 in the regression of (p —p1)on its own
• three lags [down to (f3 —p4)land testing for a zero coefficient
on p4. The implied coefficients for the lagged inflation rates are
then worked out. Here the CPI index was used for p.
21Number of Sumof
observations and
1965:1—71:1 25 0.37 0.19 0.56
1971:2—75:2 17 0.32 —0.24 0.08
1975:3—78:4 14 0.51 0.36 0.87
1979:1—82:4 16 0.62 0.42 1.04
1975:3—82:4 30 0.59 0.37 0.96
This is evidence of the considerable inertia (autoregressive
nature) of the inflationary process as well as of the shortening of the
lag in the implicit indexation of all nominal magnitudes (including
faster monetary accomodation).
At this point we may also mention the asymmetric response to upward
and downward inflationary shocks. When we add the acceleration in prices
of controlled (subsidized) products to the same regression
together with the acceleration in exchange rates (t&), this time
allowing for a different response to positive and negative shocks, we
find the following coefficients (for the period 1975:3—1983:1) —
0.284 0.002 0.320 —0.003
(0.099) (0.143) (0.143) (0.121)
As already noted in Section II, expectations and price linkages are
asymmetric when the general economic climate is an expansionary one.
When the government is running a large and persistent deficit which
22shows no evidence of declining, cost reduction will be perceived as only
temporary. We shall later mention an application of this feature to the
recent dis—inflation experience of 1981—82. At this point it is appro-
priate to turn to the role of fiscal and monetary variables.
2. The Policy Variables
Table 2 shows the government budget deficit over successive periods
since 1960. It gives both the domestic budget deficit (column 4) as a
measure of the contribution of the government to domestic demand, and
the overall budget deficit (column 5) including the government's current
account (of the balance of payments) deficit; the overall deficit is an
indication of the rate of change of government debt —internaland
external —plusmoney printing. The domestic deficit climbed sharply as
a percentage of GDP over successive periods from the start of the 1960s
till shortly after the Yom Kippur War, It then remained more—or—less
constant, before falling somewhat in 1982 and 1983. It is not only the
trend in the domestic deficit that is noteworthy, but also its absolute
size; the deficit is extremely large by international standards. With
the growth rate of GNP very high until 1973, large deficits could be
sustained without much growth in the debt/GDP ratio. But with the
average deficit in excess of 15 percent of GDP since 1974, with money
financing covering less than one fifth of the deficit, and with GDP
growing at only 3 percent, the debt/GDP ratio has risen sharply,
Table 3 presents indicators of monetary policy actions over the
same period, The increase in the growth rate of high—powered money from
period to period stands out clearly, as does the increase in the growth
rate of other nominal magnitudes. However, much of this latter growth is
23automatic, as a result of the indexation of asset returns to either the
price level or the exchange rate. The table also includes measures of
the real interest rate on government bonds over the period since 1975.
These have been impressively stable, a result both of the institutional
detail that the Knesset fixes the real interest rate on new issues, and
of the reluctance of the Bank of Israel to allow prices of bonds to
fluctuate in the secondary market.15
The policy picture, then, is one of generally expansive fiscal and
monetary policy, of stabilization of the real interest rate, and of fol-
lowing a PPP rule for the exchange rate during much of the period.
3. The Transition to Three—Digit Inflation
The major movement in the inflation rate after 1977 is associated with the
massive devaluation that accompanied the foreign exchange liberalization
at the end of 1977. Over the two quarters from 1977:3 to 1978:1, the real
dollar exchange rate rose by 30 percent. (It was less when measured
against a basket of currencies, due to the dollar appreciation.) Because
the depreciation was accompanied by reduced tariffs and subsidies, the
effective exchange rate fell by less, thus mitigating the cost—push
effects, but still leaving a large (20 percent) increase in the real cost
of imported inputs. In addition, the value of dollar—linked assets rose
considerably, creating demand—side inflationary pressures. By the middle
of 1978 the one-time shock of the devaluation appeared to be over, with
the inflation rate back to the level of the plateau from which it had
started in 1977.
15 There have, however, been periods during which the Bank of Israel has
allowed the interest rate on bank loans (as opposed to government
bonds) to change.
24But then, in the second half of 1978, the inflation ratebegan its
climb to the three—digit range, which was reached at the end of 1979, What
was the source of this rapid jump? There was some cost pressure from
wages, which rose 6 percent in real terms in 1978, partly through delayed
indexation and partly as a result of wage negotiations, butno other
majorcost—pushfactor operated at the time: the second oil shockcaine
only in 1979; the real exchange rate did not depreciate much further after
the first quarter of 1978 and, indeed, appreciated in the fourthquarter
of 1978.
On the demand side, fiscal policy during 1978 wasmore expansionary
than in 1977, with the domestic and total deficits well above the1976—77
levels. Here was one expansionary factor. Themonetary base grew by only
28 percent while prices rose by 48 percent over theyear. However, the
money stock CM1) increased at 45 percent annually while bank credit rose
80 percent. Studies of the demand formoney typically find a significant
shift in demand, during 1978, away from assets denominated in local
16
currency.Consistent withtheeconometric result is the fact that
there was a major shift into PATAN (dollar—linked) accountsduring 1978,
duringwhich ycar ways were discovered of using PATAN incurrent
transactions.'7
16
For example, Melnick (1983); Leiderman and Marom (1983).
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On the eve of the monetary reform PATAN (demand andtime) deposits were
equal to half the lira—denominated money supply; by the end of 1979
they were three times the value of the lira—denominatedmoney supply.
Evidence for a drop in the demand formoney can be obtained by looking
at the implied elasticity of change in themoney base ratio (h) in
Table 4 with respect to the change in inflation (rr). For thechange
from 1965/67 to 1974/77 we find irLh/(hLir) =—0.64while for the
change from 1974/77 to 1978/80 it is —0.82 and from 1978/80 to 1981/83
it is —1.09. Another piece of indirect evidence can be obtainedby
25With a shift in demand away from Israeli—currency denominated assets
underway, increased rates of inflation were consistent with relatively low
rates of money and particularly money—base growth.
At the end of 1978 a restrictive credit policy was undertaken —by
the Bank of Israel acting independently of the Treasury —inan attempt to
stabilize the growing balance of payments deficit and control inflation.
Ceilings were placed on the expansion of bank credit, but with free capi—
tal movements, imports of capital replaced domestic credit as a source of
financing. The restrictive policy thus failed to reduce the growth of
credit. The capital inflow problem was solved only in 1979, when capital
imports were first prohibited and then permitted —subjectto heavy
taxation.
By that stage, however, the inflation rate was already well above its
previous levels, and it would have taken a prolonged period of restrictive
policy to reduce it. The second oil shock struck in 1979, with costs to
the economy that exceeded those of the first oil shock. There was thus a
18 . sizablesupply shock.At the same time, the domestic deficit of the
government rose. Monetary policy exerted some restraining influence by
keeping the growth rate of bank credit low; once again low growth rates of
the monetary base and the Israeli—currency denominated money supply were
consistent with high rates of inflation because real demand for these
looking at the relative increase of currency in circulation compared
to demand deposits in shekels. Between 1976 and 1978 deposits grew by
102 percent while currency grew by only 74 percent, whereas in 1979
the numbers are 31 and 41 percent, respectively (1979 is when the
large PATAM increase took place).
18
As Figure 2 shows, real import prices rose much more during the second oil
shock than during the first.
26assets fell. Despite the supply shock, demand policies allowed real GNPto
rise by more than 5 percent in 1979; demand rose by more than 6.5percent,
and the current account deficit thus worsened.
4. Attempts to Arrest flation
With inflation firmly established in the three—digitrange by the third
quarter of 1979, and the government and the current account deficits
increasing, a new Finance Minister was appointed at the end of 1979.
Finance Minister Hurwjtz assumed office determined to reduce theinflation
rate and the current account deficit the old—fashionedway, by cutting
government demand and by restrictive monetary policy. The initial cuts in
government spending took the form of reduced subsidies, which immediately
raised the price level, so that the inflation rate for the lastquarter of
1979 was 168 percent. Monetary policy was defined in terms of theexpan-
sion of credit for domestic purposes; export creditswere freely granted.
The Hurwitz policy raised unemployment from less than 3percent in
1979 to over 5 percent in 1980 (see Figure 3), andsharply reduced the
current account deficit by cutting imports. Despitegrowing unemployment,
GNP increased in 1980, although domestic demand fell. The realexchange
rate stayed virtually constant, so that most of the improvement in the
balance of payments was due to the fall in domestic income and thedeple-
tion of stocks. Monetary policy defined in terms of the nominalincrease
in bank credit was restrictive throughout theyear, particularly in the
first half, and the rate of investment fell.
One might ask why Hurwitz's policies reducedemployment without
reducing inflation until much later. In the first place, the initial
measures taken to cut the budget deficit were themselves inflationary. In
27the second, it is typical that a recession starts with output falling
before inflation.
By the middle of the year, with the balance—of--payments deficit
significantly reduced, political support for maintenance of contractionary
policy was weakening, particularly in light of the approaching elections;
the end of these policies was marked by the Finance Minister's resignation
at the end of the year. There has not subsequently been an episode in
which conventional contractionary policies were used in an attempt to
reduce the inflation rate.
The beginning of 1981 saw the introduction of a new anti—inflationary
policy, under Finance Minister Aridor. The policy, introduced before the
June 1981 elections, was to keep inflation rates down by working on the
cost side, and by keeping controlled prices from rising rapidly. Subsidies
were accordingly increased, import tariffs slashed, and the exchange rate
appreciated. Similar policies had been undertaken before other elections,
though not with the same boldness. The policies had the desired effects,
seen most clearly in an 80 percent (real) increase in consumer durable
imports, and a fall in the inflation rate during the year (this may, in
part, reflect a delayed response to the earlier I-Iurwitz contractionary
policy). The budget deficit increased sharply, and monetary policy was
accommodating in that nominal magnitudes, with the exception of bank
credit, rose more rapidly than prices. The balance—of—payments deficit
also worsened.
The expansionary policies of 1981 began to take their toll in a rising
inflation rate in the first three quarters of 1982. At this point a new
inflation stabilization policy was introduced, following the lines of the
policy of early 1981. The hope was to move the economy to an inflation
28rate of 5 percent per month by keeping the rate of increase of the ex-
change rate and controlled prices to that rate. The belief was that these
measures, together with their effects on expectations, could move the
economy to a new lower inflation equilibrium.
The policy succeeded in bringing the inflation rate down somewhat, but
monetary policy was not supportive of the 5 percent inflation rate; all
nominal magnitudes were expanding at well above 100 percent per year. This
mayexplainthe asymmetry of response to downward adjustments in the
exchange rate that was recorded earlier. Domestic prices were still rising
at more than 100 percent per year implying a rapid real exchange rate
appreciation, and accompanying increasing current account deficit. At the
same time, the real wage was rising rapidly (see Figure 2).
The anti—inflationary policies were buying short—run success at the
cost of a later inflationary outburst when the nominal and real exchange
rates would have to be adjusted to deal with the current—account deficit.
Real wages and income levels would likewise have to be reduced to levels
more commensurate with domestic resources.
The failure of the Aridor policies is a result of the unwillingness to
reduceaggregate demand sufficiently to justify the new 5percentper
month equilibrium. Even if,inprinciple, the economy did have another
lowerinflation equilibrium with the same policies,19 fiscal and/or
monetary policy should have been tightened early in the Aridor program
when it was clear that the real exchange rate was appreciating and that
the policy could not be sustained.
19
With the growth rate of high—powered money the only nominal anchor in
the system, it is possible that there is another lower inflation equi—
ibrium for the economy with unchanged fiscal policy variables, and the
same amount of revenue being obtained from the printing of money.
29When the long—delayed devaluation took place in October 1983, it once
more caused jumps in the price level and in the inflation rate. The price
level increased by more than 50 percent from September to December 1983,
while the exchange rate increased by 68 percent over the same period. Cuts
in subsidies contributed to the rise in prices. The real wage fell sub-
stantially over this period, once more showing the effects of the lags in
the indexation system and the less than 100 percent indexation of wages to
prices. The rate of inflation fell in the first quarter of 1984 to the 300
percent range, but still remained well above the levels before the devalu-
ation.
Any prospects for restrictive monetary and fiscal policy vanished
with the announcement of elections for July 1984. The government once more
increased subsidies and slowed the devaluation rate to less than the
inflation rate. After a remarkably long period of quiet labor relations
following the devaluation, labor negotiations in the second quarter of
1984 resulted in nominal wage increases that restored real wage levels to
the pre—October 1983 levels. With monetary and fiscal policy expansionary,
with the need for a post—election correction of the exchange rate becoming
evident, and with widespread uncertainty about the type of policies to be
followed after the elections, the inflation rate remained in the 300—400
percent range, and the black market exchange rate opened up a 25 percent
premium over the official rate.
5. Shifts in the Inflation Rate —ASteady—State View
While our approach to inflation dynamics may explain short—run shifts in
inflation, it does not of itself provide an account of the components of
the underlying long—run inflation rate. One summary way of looking at the
30latter is to apply the framework of equation (12) to the determinants of
the monetary base and the implied steady—state inflation rate. For each
sub—period we may calculate the difference between the ratio of domestic
government finance (ó) and the part of the growth in net financial assets
(money and debt) that individuals would be willing to hold given GNP
growth and the average financial asset ratio [(h +b)].The ratio of the
resulting net injection to the money base should be consistent with the
20
underlying inflation rate.
The components of this calculation are shown in Table 4 and the
resulting index appears in line 7 and is compared in line 8 with the mean
inflation rate, by sub—period. Since the money base ratio is itself a
function of the inflation rate, and the failing GNP growth rate, too, may
at least partly be related to rising inflation, one should not interpret
this comparison in pure one—way causality terms. It does, nonetheless,
indicate that the shift in the underlying inflation rate from one phase to
another could be related to three important respective developments: the
rise in the deficit between the two wars (1968—73), the fail in the
growth rate after the 1973—74 crisis, and the probable drop in the demand
for money in the period after 1977. It Is interesting to note that the
index points to an implied money—base growth rate (267 percent) that is
higher than actual inflation (141 percent) during 1981—83. By the end of
1983, we remember inflation did in fact catch up with this higher figure.
While the actual jump in inflation in October 1983 may be attributed to
the dynamic effects of a delayed devaluation in a perfectly accommodated
20
For an empirical application of this framework to the analysis of the
jumps in the inflation rate see Melnick (1983) and Melnick and Sokoler
(1984). A similar framework was first discussed by N. Liviatan,
31monetary system, this calculation at least shows that the more recent jump
was not inconsistent with the underlying fiscal and monetary determinants.
IV. POLICY ISSUES
1. The role of indexation
Indexation is at the top of most lists of villains in the Israeli infla—
tion. Any analysis that blames indexation for the inflation has to contend
with the fact that indexation has been widespread in the Israeli economy
since the 1950s, whereas the inflation rate did not reach exaggerated
levels until the 1970g.
The standard view that indexation is to blame for inflation is correct
in the sense that without indexation, the costs of inflation would have
been so high that the inflation rate would not have reached its current
levels. The government would have been forced to stabilize well before the
three—digit range was reached.
Beyond this valid point, we distinguish between the roles of indexa—
tion of wages and indexatlon of the values of financial assets. Because
wage indexation is less than 100 percent, the pattern of typically inc-
reasing real wages seen in Figure 3 could not have been attained without
discretionary wage fixing, especially in more recent years. There is no
reason to think that labor would have been more willing to take real wage
cuts in the absence of indexation; nor, given the lags in indexation, is
it likely that nominal wages would have adjusted significantly more slowly
in the absence of indexation.
Indexation of financial asset returns does, however, significantly
reduce the automatic stabilization of the economy. Price and exchange—rate
32shocks automatically affect the nominal value of large stocks of assets.
The effect of a given devaluation on the balance of payments is thereby
also reduced. More active accompanying fiscal policy could compensate for
the loss of automatic stabilization, but variations in government spending
and taxes are neither costless nor easily achieved.
The difficulties created for the stability of the system by the debt
are a result not only of indexation but also of the size of the debt. If
the debt were small, as it had been in the 1950s and 1960s, the change in
the nominal value of wealth resulting from a given shock to prices or the
exchange rate would also be small, and the stabilizing power of the real
balance effect would be proportionately greater. Further, the continued
issuance of indexed as opposed to nominal debt can itself be viewed as an
endogenous response to the need to finance large budget deficits: the
public simply would not have been prepared to lend to the government on
terms that gave the government the option to repudiate the debt through
21
inflation.
So long as the debt and inflation continue to be large, there is no
prospect for shifting to a different structure of assets, though steps
could be taken to reduce the liquidity of the debt. A sharp cut in the
government budget deficit sufficient to begin reducing the debt/GDP ratio
would eventually both reduce the difficulties created by the indexation of
21 . Itis not obvious that an optimizing trustworthy government operating
in an environment with considerable macro—risk should issue indexed
debt. The issue is complicated by the inter—generational nature of the
risk—sharing implied by public debt issue: issuing indexed debt gives
the current generation of savers a claim of fixed value on later
generations of producers. The question of the optimal form of govern-
ment debt issue is closely connected with the problem of
jnjstc; see Lucas and Stokey (1983).
33the debt and make it possible to begin issuing different types of debt.22
2. The costs of inflation
There has been very little research on the costs of inflation in Israel.
The co—incidence of the rise in the inflation rate after 1973 with the
reduction in the growth rate is generally suspected to be more than that:
in one direction we have already seen above that a fall in the growth rate
is likely to increase the inflation rate; less firmly established is the
causal link from high inflation to low growth. It is not sufficient to
point to the Israeli experience, for there has been a worldwide reduction
in the growth rate of output, shared by countries like Japan where the
inflation rate fell from the 1960s, and countries like Israel where the
inflation rate increased. While we believe that the continuation of infla-
tion in Israel is partly to blame for low growth, we are uncomfortably
aware that the case has not been proved.
One source of the relationship between the growth rate of output and
rising inflation maybethe increasing diversion of resources to financial
activities as inflation increases. Preliminary results by Kleiman (1984)
suggest that increasing activity in the financial sector absorbed an extra
3—4percentof GNPby1982, The well—knownmeasureof the costs of antici-
pated inflation as the area under the demand curve for high—powered money
21
Indexation of debt in Israel applies almost entirely to government
bonds. There has been virtually no private issue of indexed debt;
behind every major, apparently private—sector indexed liability (such
as long term savings accounts in banks, or indexed life insurance)
stand government indexed bonds. The government is active as a finan-
cial intermediary, borrowing indexed from the public to make (until
1979) non—indexed loans to the private sector, or to offer subsidized
credit for exports, housing, and other forms of investment.
34gives estimatesof the cost of 160 percentinflation as being about 2—3
percentofGNP. Thisisan alternativeestimateoftheincreased absorp—
tion of resourcesinmaking financial transactions.
These are useful lower bound estimates of the costs ofinflation, but
familiar stories of the increasing inefficiency of theprice system, the
diversion of managers' time to financial instead of realoutput decisions,
the inefficiency and —withrising inflation —theprogressive breakdown
of the tax system, and so forth, suggest the costsare much higher
However, the existence of indexed assets in Israel means thatone of
the major costs of and concerns about (uncertain) inflation—theinabi—
lity to protect the real value of savings —isnot present, or at least is
present only to the extent that there is uncertainty about thegovern—
rnent's ability to meet its formal commitments, This differenceaccounts
for the lesser public concern expressed about inflation inIsrael than in
other countries with much lower inflation rates.
3. Public opInion about inflation
There has not been any overwhelmingpressure of public opinion in Israel
to end the inflation. In part this has been because thereare pressing
non—economic issues before the electorate; in addition, thecosts of
inflation are not perceived to be great.
The indexation system protects the public from what inother coun-
tries would be the major costs associated withhigh and uncertain infla-
tion. Further, although the rise in inflation in Israelwas accompanied by
slower growth, it has in recentyears also been accompanied by a rapidly
rising standard of living. For the years 1980—1983, privateconsumption
increased by 28 percent (while GNPgrewonly 6 percent). Under these
35conditions the public may be excused f or not seeing a pressing need to end
inflation —particularlywhen it is well known that the adjustment process
would require a transitory period of unemployment.
4. Stabilization programs
We do not provide a full discussion here, rather touching on the issues
that have been raised in the debate.
The economy is seen as facing both real and nominal problems. On the
real side the balance—of—payments deficit is viewed as too large, leaving
the economy sensitive to both political pressure from the United States
government and to changes in opinion in the world capital markets; simi-
larly, the budget deficit is too large, implying a national debt that is
growing too rapidly, and diverting too much of the private sector's saving
to government debt. On the nominal side, there is a need to reduce the
inflation rate and the sensitivity of the price level to shocks hitting
the economy.
The first set of issues are those of whether to attempt to stabilize,
and how rapidly. As the inflation rate has increased, economists have
moved increasingly towards the views that reducing the inflation rate back
to the low double digit range is desirable, and that this could only be
carried out through a comprehensive stabilization program that attempts to
make the adjustment rapidly rather than gradually. The conclusion that
inflation should be ended has been reached because of the increasing
perception of the economy and the financial system as out of control,
tending over time always to higher inflation rates, and with an increasing
frequency of balance of payments crises. The low growth —highinflation
correlation of the economy has also influenced the argument.
36The conclusion that the program should becomprehensive and rapid has
been reached on political economy, and notpurely economic, grounds. The
failure of successive governments since 1977 topersist with restrictive
policies for periods of much more than half ayear raises the fear that
any gradualist program in which restrictive policy —forinstance, a
continuing series of budget cuts —issupposed to be maintained over
several years is unlikely to be followed throughby the government. Hence
the conclusion that the tough medicine should be takenall at once.
The list of measures included in theprogram starts from a cut in the
budget deficit. The justification for and the proposed size ofcuts
varies: for instance Liviatan and Piterman (in thisvolume) argue that the
budget deficit matters mainly because it affects the balance ofpayments,
and that a cut in the deficit of 3—4percentof GNP would be sufficient;
others (ourselves included) point to thelarge and growing debt as so
constraining monetary policy (because of the need to rollover the debt
and prevent rising interest payments frommaking the budget deficit
larger) and increasing the likelihood of future crises thatit is essen-
tial to move rapidly to a balanced budgetso that the debt/GNP ratio can
start failing.
It is also generally agreed that in thelong run monetary policy
should play a stronger role in theeconomy, with perhaps explicit adoption
of monetary growth targets. Strict adherenceto monetary targets in an
extremely open economy is, however, unlikely, for exchangerate distur-
bances originating abroad will at times haveto be offset by monetary
policy.
The difficult issues of a stabilizationprogram arise in discussion of
the measures that shouldaccompany the initial budget cuts, in the attempt
37to minimize the unemployment costs of the transition to a low inflation
equilibrium. One approach that has received support is to attempt to move
almost immediately to a zero or low inflation equilibrium through an
agreement with the Histadrut to freeze nominal wages, by fixing the ex-
change rate, and by attempting to control prices. The difficulty in this
approach is that the program will have to start with a real devaluation
andchangesin relative prices of goods, that would certainly make it
difficult to control the absolute level of prices —oralternatively could
lead to damaging relative price distortions and greater unemployment.
Another difficulty with this approach is that it Is almost certain that
readjustments of prices and the exchange rate will be necessary after some
time, and that these readjustments could reignite inflation.
An alternative approach would first implement budget cuts and wait
for unemployment to emerge before trying to reduce the inflation rate
through a co—ordinated package of measures. This approach can be seen as
trying to solve therealproblem first and the nominal one later. The
danger in this approach is that the large unemployment costs incurred at
the beginning would lead to the abandonment of the second—stage inflation
reduction part of the program.
The issue of how to handle the large stock of indexed assets in the
economy during this transition period and for the future stability of the
economy has also received attention. There have been many proposals to
reduce the liquidity of the dollar—indexed PATAN accounts, though less
detail on how to do this; there was also at the time of writing fear that
a new government would in some way reduce the value of these assets as
part of a stabilization program. A capital levy, which would reduce the
value of the outstanding debt without taxing especially those who had in
38the past purchased government debt was also on someagendas.
Finally, we briefly discuss the dollarization alternative that was
proposed at the end of 1983 by Finance Minister Aridor in the wake of the
failure of his previous policies If the Israelieconomy were Indeed to
move to complete use of the dollar, its long—run inflation rate would be
thatofthe United States23 and inflation would be ended quickly.
There is no guarantee, however, that such a change would reduce theunem—
ployment Costs of the transition to a lower inflation rate.
From a purely economic viewpoint dollarlzation is undesirablebecause
the country would pay to the United Statesgovernment the revenue that it
would otherwise be obtaining for itself through theprinting of money. In
addition, Israel would be accepting the American exchange rate vis—à—vis
other currencies: for instance, if Israel had beenon the dollar in the
last few years its currency would have appreciatedsubstantially relative
to Europe. This would not have been desirable.
There are of course nationalist reasons not to dollarize.Adoption of
a well planned stabilization program would make it less likely that
dollarization would in the end be the only available solution for the
economy.
23
Except for minor deviations arising from changes in theprices of
nontraded goods.
39Table 1. Inflation Rate, Growth Rate, Current Account Deficit, and
Relative Price Changes, 1960—1984
































60:1—65:1 20 6.8 96a199a 93a 27a
2 Recession
65:1—67:2 9 6.1 —1.5 15.3 —1.1 —4.8 5.2
3 Recovery
67:2—70:1 11 2.0 14.6 18.5 4.7 6.4 2.4
4 Boom
70:1—73:3 14 14.4 9.1 22.0 2.2 2.9 2.2
5 War and
oil shock
73:3—77:2 15 36.0 2.6 30.9 —0.7 —0.4 2.9
6 Traverse
77:2—79:4 10 71.0 3.0 23.5 5.3 4.8 1.0
7 Plateau




aCalculated from annual data.
Definitions
Col. (4): Total deficit divided by GDP (this is a level ratio).
Col. (5): Rate of change of export prices, at effective exchange rate,
deflated by CPI.
Col. (6): Rate of change of domestic import prices, at effective exchange
rate, deflated by CPI.
Sources:Calculated from quarterly national accounts, Central Bureau of
Statistics.


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1960—64 27.0 1.2 28.8 —1.8 —0.6 2.5 —3.3 0.3
1965—67 32.0 2.8 29.6 2.4 5.2 2.2 0 3.0
1968—73 41.0 6.6 34.4 6.6 13.2 3.2 5.4 4.6
1974—77 56.4 3.3 42.1 14.3 17.6 2.6 4,7 10.4
1978—80 60.7 2.0 45.5 15.2 17.2 2.0 7.3 6.9
1981—83 61.0—0.3 46.5 14.4 14.1 2.1 7.2 4.9
1983a 59.0—0.2 48.1 10.9 10.7 2.3 1.4 7.0
a
Excludes 4 percent purchase by Bank of Israel ofcommercial
[which could be added to columns (1), (4),(5), and (7)].
Definitions:
(1)Domestic expenditure includes goods andservices, subsidies, transfers and
interest on the public debt.
(2) Net foreign expenditure is defined asgovernment expenditure abroad (mainly
armaments) plus interest on debt minusunilateraltransfers (mainly U.S.
government)
(3) Taxes include all direct and indirect taxes andtransfers to government. (4) =(1)-(3).
(5) =(1)+(2)—(3)=(6)+(7)+(8)=Totalfinance of deficit.
(7) Domestic debt finance incorporates indexed bondsand, after 1977, also the
Bank of Israel PATAM accounts, Figuresare net of repayments and of loans
to the public sector (8.9 percent in 1968—73, 4.3percent in 1974—77, and
very small afterwards.
Sources:
1960—80 —L.Meridor (1983, unpublished).
1981—83 —Bankof Israel Report, 1983 (to be revised).
Definitions of columns (1), (4), (7) slightly altered between two sources (by
the order of no more than 1—2 percent).
(percent of GDP)
bank shares
41Table 3. Monetary Variables, 1960—1983


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1Normal
growth
60:1—65:1 6.8 18.2 17.4 — — —
2Recession
65:1—67:2 6.1 10.6 16.4 — — —
3Recovery
67:2—70:1 2.0 4.7 9.1 — — —
4Boom
70:1—73:3 14.4 34.9 24.8 35.7 —
5War and
oil shock
73:3—77:2 36.0 23.8 26.5 28.7 44.8 21C
6Traverse
77:2—79:4 71.0 25.8 37.0 75.1 102.9 2.3
7Plateau
79:4—83:3 123.3 103.2 97.1 126.6 106.1 25d
a Columns(1) to (5) based on quarterly compounding.
b




Mean 80—82 (in 1982 it was 1.9).
Source: Bank of Israel.
42Table 4. Government Injection to Money Base and the Rate ofInflation
1965—67 1968—73 1974—77 1978—80 1981—83
1.Financial asset ratio
(h +b) (0.5) 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.3
2.Percentage money base
to GNP (h) 12.5 13.4 9.8 5.2 2.7
3.Percentage GNP growth (g)3.2 10.3 2.6 3.5 1.6
4.Domestic government
finance ratio (it) —2.2 8.6 7.3 9.3 9.3
5.Of which:
Growth factor (1. x 3.) 1.6 6.2 2.6 3.9 2.1
6.Net injection (4. —5.) 0.6 2.4 4.7 5.4 7.2
7.Net injection Imoneybase
(6.12.) 5 18 48 104 267
8.Inflation rate (percent) 5 11
Sources:
Line 1. Yariv (1982); 1965—67 figure assumedsame as 1970; 1968—73 is the
average for 1970—73.
Line 2. Bank of Israel.
Line 3. Central Bureau of Statistics.
Line 4. Columns (6) +(7)of Table 2.
Line 8. Central Bureau of Statistics.
Note: 1981—83 data are subject to revision.
43Figure 1. Rate of CPI Inflation
(Annual percentages, each quarter over same quarter previous year)
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